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Explaining Ghana’s Recent Good Cocoa Karma: Smuggling Incentive Argument 
Abstract 
The paper contends that the current boom in cocoa exports from Ghana is 
primarily in response to reversal in price incentives to smuggle Ghana cocoa to La Cote 
d’Ivoire and not due to productivity gains in the Ghana cocoa supply chain. Using recent 
data; ADF, Perron and KPSS tests of stationarity; Engle and Granger and Johansen co-
integration tests; Granger causality tests; single and vector error correction models; as well as 
partial adjustment models, we estimate the Ghana cocoa supply response to determine the 
most pertinent factors that explain the cocoa boom. Different from previous research, the 
VECM and ECM models are modified to be more reflective of current conditions in the 
Ghana cocoa sector by including prices of relevant substitutes in cocoa production. 
Furthermore we carefully account for the time series properties of the data and address 
endogeneity problems that plague the estimation. For example, in testing for the order of 
integration of different series, we account for the possible existence of structural breaks. We 
find that the “price incentive to smuggle” argument adequately explains the current boom in 
Ghana cocoa supply response. This finding is important because it questions claims in the 
literature that substantial productivity gains in the cocoa sector in response to good policy is 
the main reason behind the Ghana cocoa export boom. 
Introduction 
Ghana’s recent robust economic growth, occurring at the same time as the country’s 
cocoa sector is booming, has attracted some interest in the economics literature (Zeitlin, 2005). 
However, establishing that productivity growth in the cocoa industry is the reason for Ghana’s 
growth is non-trivial and is not the focus of this research. This is because economic growth is 
typically a complicated process that occurs along numerous dimensions with one single factor 
often not enough to explain growth. However, what is undeniable is the coincident good 
performance of Ghana’s economy and its cocoa industry (Ghana Ministry of Agriculture 2005). 
Given current impressive concurrent cocoa export sector and economy-wide growth, after very 
dismal performance in the 1970-1990’s period, the aim of the current research is to model and 
estimate the Ghana’s cocoa supply to determine the reasons that explain Ghana’s current good Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
  3
cocoa Karma. We model Ghana cocoa supply as a function of the smuggling incentive which 
Bulir (2002) defines as the ratio of real Ghana cocoa producer prices to real Cote D’Ivoire 
(CIV) cocoa producer prices.  We contend that this research is important as it affords a 
mechanism to analyze the effect of smuggling of cocoa in or out of Ghana on the country’s 
cocoa exports over time. The research is very pertinent given political event in CIV in the 
recent past.  Specifically the CIV, Ghana’s immediate neighbor and the largest cocoa producer 
in the world, has had a major conflict in 2001 and several major up risings in the recent past 
some degree of calm has been restored. Has the fundamental structure of Ghana cocoa supply 
changed presumably because of some exogenous productivity spurt in the cocoa sector or is the 
political situation in the CIV influencing export trends in Ghana.  
The volume of Ghana’s cocoa exports has expanded significantly in the last several 
years after many years of decline followed by a mediocre performance recovery (ICCO 2005, 
IMF country report 1995). Not surprisingly, cocoa prices paid to Ghanaian cocoa farmers have 
also appreciated both in nominal and real terms; The nominal price per bag of cocoa beans paid 
to farmers by Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD) which was 70000 cedis in 1995, 
topped 9000000 cedis by 2004, representing an astronomical increase of 1186% although after 
exchange rate effects and inflation are accounted for this increase is less impressive (Ghana 
Ministry of Agriculture, 2005).  
To explain the severe contraction in Ghanaian cocoa supply from 1960s to the 1995s 
(a 60% decline) Bulir (2003) appealed to the reversal in price-incentive to smuggle Ghana 
cocoa to CIV. He explained that distortionary effect of domestic taxes in Ghana widened the 
gap between the CIV and Ghanaian domestic prices, and ultimately created incentives to 
smuggle Ghana cocoa to the CIV (Bulir, 2003). Bulir argued that the monopoly position of CIV Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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enabled that country to pay better domestic prices to its farmers. Rational Ghanaian farmers 
therefore smuggled their cocoa to CIV when the expected gain from smuggling Ghana cocoa to 
CIV outweighed the transportation and transaction costs that this risky adventure entails. Bulir 
used a co-integration model and a single equation error correction model to make his point. 
Given Bulir’s argument, it seems reasonable to conjecture therefore that the ongoing political 
instability in the CIV presumably reversed price incentives to smuggle Ghana cocoa to CIV and 
more than anything else can explain the good times in the Ghanaian cocoa industry today. 
  This paper argues that because Ghana has been a relatively safe country in the West 
African sub–region than CIV for the past few years, price incentives to smuggle Ghanaian 
cocoa to the CIV should be drastically reduced if not reversed.  Furthermore, over the last 
decade, the Ghana government has increased efforts to ensure that cocoa farmers get a lion 
share of cocoa export revenues (Ghana Ministry of Agriculture 2005).  Some of the incentives 
the government has put in place include across the board reduction in cocoa tax rates and the 
encouragement of the formation of cocoa associations for example, the Kuapa initiatives. By 
exploiting the fact that opportunity cost of smuggling Ghana cocoa to CIV has sky-rocketed 
(due to the real danger of being either killed or robbed by smuggling to the CIV because of the 
war) as against receiving a non-random, safe domestic price from the COCOBOD, Ghanaian 
cocoa farmers should substitute for the latter. Ghanaian cocoa exports should therefore climb as 
more Ghanaian farmers substitute towards selling to COCOBOD to take advantage of better 
prices. A further boost to Ghanaian cocoa exports will be the contribution to total Ghana 
exports of CIV farmers smuggling cocoa to Ghana because of declining differential in prices 
between CIV and domestic Ghana producer prices as Ivory Coast market share has plummeted 
causing it to lose market power and reducing its ability to guarantee higher domestic prices to Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
  5
its own its. In other words, the amount of Ghana-CIV cocoa smuggling could be driven to zero 
and smuggling may actually go in the reverse direction (from CIV to Ghana) following the 
price incentive reversal and the substantial increase in uncertainty in the CIV cocoa chain.  If 
this is true Ghanaian cocoa exports should increase significantly both in absolute terms and 
relative to CIV, which is what we see. After testing for, and correcting for stationarity using the 
KPSS, ADF and Perron tests, I test for structural break using traditional Chow Tests and the 
Zivot Andrews (1992) or the ZA test to verify whether the Ghanaian cocoa sector changed in a 
significant way before and after the war in CIV
1. I also perform co-integration and Granger 
causality tests to investigate the relationship between word cocoa and domestic Ghana and CIV 
producer and CIV prices. To isolate the most important determinant of the export boom in 
Ghana, I build on the error correction models by Awudu and Reider (1994) and Bulir (2002). 
  The model used in this paper is therefore a hybrid of the models used by these authors. The 
difference apart from more recent data and augmenting their model with relevant substitutes in 
production is that I carefully account for the time series properties of the data. To illustrate, I 
test for structural breaks caused by for example the CIV war in 2001 using both the ZA test and 
the Chow test.  I also test for stationarity using both the Perron (1989) test and the ADF test. 
Furthermore in testing for unit root I specifically account for structural breaks in the data. We 
find that the final model and procedure employed does a satisfactory job in explaining the 
supply response of Ghanaian cocoa and the boom in exports, than other current postulated 
explanations.  
Section II reviews the literature on Ghanaian cocoa supply response; critiques 
previous supply models for Ghanaian cocoa, and provide a brief overview of the Ghanaian 
                                                 
1 Ghana is the second largest exporter of cocoa beans and shares a border with CIV, the world’s largest 
cocoa exporter on its western border. Not surprisingly, the war in CIV most likely had non-trivial 
consequences for the Ghana cocoa sector. Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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cocoa production process.  Section III describes the data, and explains the theory and 
procedures used and outlines Awudu et al and Bulir’s models as well as my modification of the 
model to account for more recent trends. The VECM model specification I use and the reason 
why I include the VECM is also explained. Section IV presents and discusses the results, and 
Section V concludes.   
Relevant Literature 
  Although models of cocoa supply in Ghana is found more frequently in the literature than 
models of other perennials in the economics literature, the sum total of models of perennials in 
general including cocoa models remains unimpressive (Bulir, 2002). The biological lag 
between the planting decision date and output date presents unique challenges for econometric 
modeling not only for cocoa, but also for all perennials. Empirical problems also arise because 
of incomplete, unrecorded or missing data pertaining to plantings, removals and re-planting, 
yield variations and yield composition (King, French and Minami, 1985). The lack of 
popularity of models for perennial crop supply response in the economics and agricultural is 
therefore not surprising
2 Cocoa trees take time (specifically up to six
3 years) to yield the first 
harvest after planting (Awudu and Reider, 1995).  The cocoa supply modeling literature has 
therefore evolved as different analysts have tried to obtain more accurate forecast models by 
taking into account not only the lag but also other exogenous factors that affect output; for 
example, cocoa output price instability, cocoa production variability (probably caused by bad 
weather and also the availability of inputs into production (or rather the lack thereof) have all 
received considerable attention in the literature (King, French and Minami, 1985). The earliest 
                                                 
2 We recognize the challenge presented by the need to define an expectation formulation mechanism.  For 
simplicity we assume that the expected price of the domestic price is the world price 
3 New fast maturing varieties can produce fruit in as little as two years but the stock of trees is still of the 
old variety as cocoa trees can produce beans every year for up to 40 years after the first crop. Other 
perennials may take more time to bear their first fruit Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
  7
literature on Ghana cocoa supply response comprised mainly of models that investigated the 
response of farmers to economic incentives for example Bateman ( 1976 and 1990) and 
Brempong-Gyimah (1992). More recently Teal and Vigneri (2004) and Zeitlin (2005) have all 
analyzed Ghana cocoa.  Ales Bulir notes that Ghana cocoa supply models in the economics 
literature fall into three broad groups (Bulir, 2003). The first flavor of models approach cocoa 
supply response as a “technological function” of the stock of cocoa trees and fertilization 
efforts.  ere The second and more common category of Ghana cocoa supply models were 
partial adjustment models
4.  The analysis by Bethelemy and Morrison (1987) and Jaeger (1992) 
fall into this category.  Partial adjustment models were sometimes used in combination with 
Nerlove supply models (Nerlove, 1979) although prominent economists, including Nerlove 
himself have harshly criticized these models because of unrealistic assumptions. At the time of 
these critiques Partial Adjustment (PA) models did not account for possible stationarity of the 
data series (although now they do).  Unfortunately OLS on non-stationary data produces 
spurious regressions Engle and Granger (1987).  Partial adjustment models also assumed a 
fixed supply based on stationary expectations limiting their usefulness in the context of 
dynamic optimization
5 (Hallam and Zanobi 1993).  
As more powerful statistical methods surfaced in the empirical literature research 
moved from partial adjustment models to error correction models that test for stationarity and 
employ co-integration techniques. Co-integration solves the problem of spurious regression and 
determines whether there is a long-term relationship between non-stationary series integrated of 
same order Engle and Granger (1987).  Error-correction models also correct yet another short-
coming of the partial adjustment model in that they make it feasible to estimate both long and 
                                                 
4 See model I in Section II for an example 
5 Ghana cocoa supply response modeling is obviously an exercise in dynamics so this assumption of 
stationary expectations is especially problematic. Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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short run supply response in the same model (Hallam and Zanobi 1993).  More recent models 
therefore test for and correct for stationarity and employ error–correction and co-integration 
methods for example Abdulai and Reider (1994). The contribution this paper makes is to 
ensure that unit root tests are only applied to data that do not incorporate structural breaks since 
a structural break can induce a trend that can bias unit root test towards accepting the null of 
non-stationarity. Tests of structural breaks are executed with the ZA test that does not assume 
the break point ex ante ad therefore avoids biasing the test result ex post.  
The last group of models that Bulir identifies recognizes the significant explanatory 
power of the price incentive to smuggle Ghanaian cocoa to Cote d’Ivoire for Ghana cocoa 
supply response and vice versa.  Bulir (2002-2003)’s models cocoa supply response as a 
function of the price differential between the Ghanaian and CIV producer price (smuggling 
incentive is defined as a ratio of deflated US dollar denominated CIV domestic producer price 
to deflated US dollar denominated Ghana producer price) and is the best example to date in my 
opinion.  In the price-incentive to smuggle flavor of models, Ghanaian farmers are assumed to 
respond to relative prices in the short run.  After analyzing opportunity costs, they decide 
whether or not to harvest the cocoa, smuggle it to CIV or sell to the local COCOBOD (That is 
they have to decide whether the prevailing domestic Ghana cocoa producer price is preferable 
to smuggling).  By contrast, long run planting decisions are a function of the international 
cocoa price so world price is the expectation of the local cocoa producer prices.  The model 
used in this paper follows the approach just described.   
Data, Methods and Theory 
The data for the project was obtained from different sources.  Ales Bulir kindly provided the 
data covering the period 1977 to 1995 used in his original paper for the variables included in Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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his original model. Since maize production is recognized as the main substitute to the 
production of cocoa by Ghanaian farmers, I obtained data on the average yearly price of a 
100kg maize bag sold in Ghana from the Statistics Research Institute (SRID) of the Ghanaian 
Ministry of Agriculture. The maize price data was then appropriately deflated by the Ghana 
CPI series. Ghana cocoa producer price data and cocoa supply data for the period 1995 – 2005 
was obtained from the Ghanaian ministry of Agriculture and also from FAO country reports.  
Real Ghana cocoa producer price data was generated by deflating the nominal producer prices 
with the Ghana CPI (which reflects the rural consumer basket).  The deflated data was then 
converted to equivalent dollar value using the exchange rate for each year. The average annual 
world price data from 1977 to 2005 was obtained from the ICCO website. Deflated world 
cocoa producer price data was generated by deflating the nominal producer prices with the US 
CPI (which was assumed to represent the world basket of goods). FAO provided the CIV data 
for the 1995 -2004 period.  Real CIV producer price data was generated by deflating the 
nominal producer prices with the CIV CPI (which reflects the rural CIV consumer basket).  The 
deflated data was then converted to equivalent dollar value using the exchange rate for each 
year. Ghanaian and CIV Exchange rate and CPI data for the period 1977 to 2005 was obtained 
from the BMI Index of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign.  
Structural-break tests: It is possible that the underlying structure of the Ghanaian cocoa supply 
function (here supply response is assumed identical to total export volume) might have changed 
precisely because of exogenous factors such as the war in the CIV.  To ensure parameter 
constancy, we use the ZA test to avoid bias in the estimators coming from incorrectly imposing 
the break date used in testing for structural break. The ZA test has null of unit root with an 
alternate of stationarity with a one time break in the series.  The ZA test results were used to Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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identify the temporal location of the most likely structural break date after which the Chow 
(1960) test was applied to verify parameter constancy. For the Chow test, we defined a dummy, 
which takes a value of 1 for the period before 1999, and 0 otherwise to avoid bias in the 
estimators coming from incorrectly imposing constant parameters. The results of the structural 
break tests (Table 1) are discussed in the results section 
Stationarity tests: The ADF test was used to test for unit roots the results are displayed in Table 
2 in the results section. All variables are tested for stationarity (Table 1).  Furthermore, apart 
from the Smuggling incentive variable, all other variables listed below are in logs:  Average 
annual Ghana cocoa supply, Ghana cocoa producer price, and international cocoa price.   
Although the ADF test is the primary test used for checking stationarity of the data, it is 
obviously limited in some respects especially when the data is~ I (1).  The ADF test has a null 
of unit root so suppose the test has low power (low type 1 error), then ADF cannot reject the 
null and we get non-stationarity most of the time.  A complementary test is the KPSS test due 
to Kwiakowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992).  The KPSS test has a null of stationarity 
therefore if your data is actually stationarity then you will not likely make any errors (Bart, H., 
Hans Frances, P., Ooms M (1998)).   However the real value of the KPS test is when the data is 
actually non-stationary.  In this case even if you fail to reject Ho: non-stationarity with ADF, 
you will reject Ho: stationarity with KPSS.  Table 2 compares the results of the ADF and KPSS 
tests of unit root 
ii.  Co-integration. Co-integration techniques help us avoid spurious regressions. Spurious 
regressions result when OLS is executed on non-stationary variables Engle and Granger (1987).  
The results of such spurious regressions have no statistical meaning therefore spurious 
regressions must be avoided at all cost.  To illustrate co-integration, suppose two series X and Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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Y are individually non-stationary and integrated of the same order say integrated of order one 
or I (1).  If there exist a linear combination of these two series that is stationary i.e. I (0) then X 
and Y are co-integrated.  Since world cocoa prices are assumed to be the expectation of 
domestic cocoa producer prices, world cocoa price data is used in the co-integration 
relationship with Ghana cocoa supply and not domestic cocoa producer prices. We test for co-
integration relationships and Granger causality between the smuggling incentive, Ghana cocoa 
supply response, world cocoa, substitute maize price and domestic cocoa producer prices in a 
multivariate framework. Granger causality tests are relevant here given co-integration to predict 
the direction of causation in the long run relationship. Possible Co-integration and Granger 
Causality relationships include:  i)  International Price and Producer Price of Cocoa ii)
  Smuggling Incentive and Cocoa Supply response iii)  Maize  Price  and  Cocoa  Supply 
(Substitute relationship) and iv) Producer Price and cocoa supply response. If co-integration 
relationships are established for the pairs of variables in the list above, then we surmise that the 
following Granger Causality relationships will be manifest. International prices Granger causes 
the domestic producer price, the Smuggling incentive Granger causes Cocoa Supply Response, 
Average Maize Producer Price Granger causes Cocoa supply response and finally Ghana Cocoa 
Producer prices Granger causes supply response. The results are presented in Table 3 and Table 
4 and are discussed in the results section. All models specified are presented next: 
Mathematical Presentation of Models 
Model i: Partial Adjustment models 
 At
c  = α + At-1
c  +  β1Pt
c  +β2Pt
m   + β3Dt
   + εt 
At
c          = Cocoa  output 
At-1
c     =   Lagged cocoa output 
Pt
c           =  Domestic Ghana Cocoa producer Price 
Pt
m       =
   Maize producer price (represents substitutes, maize is main competition) 
Dt            =  Dummy Variable ( = 1 if recorded after 1999). Table 5 in the result section has the 
regression output for the partial adjustment specification of the model  
Model ii: Awudu and Reider (1994).   Single Equation Error Correction Model Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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∆At
c  = a0 +  a1∆Pt
c  + a1∆Mt
s   - γ (At-1
c - b1Pt-1
c  - b2Mt-1
s)
   + Ut 
∆Mt
s       =     Change in manufacturing goods supply 
∆Pt
c       =     Change in Cocoa prices 
∆At
c     =     Change in cocoa supply 
γ         =          Error  correction  parameter that captures the speed of the adjustment to 
disequilibrium conditions. Table 6a in the result section has the regression output for Awudu & 
Reider’s specification of the of the EC model  
 
 
Model iii:  Bulir, Ales (2003) Error correction with Smuggling Incentive 
 
















Smuggling Incentive t-1   +    γ (Supplyt-1 – δ1 
International price t-1   – δ2 Smuggling incentive t-1 ) + ε where γ is the error correction parameter 
that captures the speed of the adjustment to disequilibrium conditions. Because international 
prices are used as a proxy for expectation of domestic producer prices, international prices do 
not enter the short run portion of the error correction model. Similarly domestic producer prices 
do not enter the long run version of the model. Table 6b in the result section has the regression 
output for Ales Bulir original specification of the model with the complete available data set 
Model iv: Hybrid: Error correction with reduced smuggling incentives and dummy 
















B2i Smuggling Incentive t-1   +    B3∆PMt
s   
 
γ (Supplyt-1 – δ1 International price t-1   – δ2 Smuggling incentive t-1    -   δ3PMt
s) + Dt +  ε where 
∆PMt
s          =      Change in Price of Maize 
∆Pt
c           =      Change in Cocoa prices 
∆At
c          =        Change in cocoa supply 
γ              =            Error  correction  parameter that captures the speed of the adjustment to 
disequilibrium conditions 
Dt             =      Dummy variable = 1 for 1999, 0 otherwise  
Table 6c in the result section has the regression output for the hybrid specification of the model 
(but with the 
complete available data set) 
Discussion of Results 
Over all, the result from the research exercise was consistent with our research hypothesis.  The 
“Price Incentive to Smuggle Ghana cocoa to CIV” variable is statistically and negatively 
related to Ghana cocoa supply response in the short run
6. This makes sense given we had 
defined the smuggling incentive variable as CIV price / Ghana price. That is as the price mark 
                                                 
6 Refer to results in Table 6.   Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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up of the CIV price of the Ghana price declines, Ghanaian cocoa export booms.  However some 
surprises also emerged which begs for closer analysis of the data.  Table 1 reports the result of 
our structural break test.  Due to the war in the CIV we hypothesized that if there was a change 
in the smuggling incentive data, it probability occurred around 1991.  As Table 1 illustrates 
however, we rejected the null of structural break occurring at 1991.  We carry out ADF tests to 
check for the stationarity of the series we used in the exercise, the results are all presented in 
Table 2.  All the series are integrated of order 1 (i.e. I(1)).  They are therefore non-stationary in 
the levels but stationary in the first differences.  For two series to be co-integrated, they must 
necessary be integrated of the same order. Fortunately, the main variables used: average real 
price of a 100kg  maize bag sold in Ghana, Ghana cocoa supply, average annual real producer 
price of Ghana cocoa converted to dollars for each year at the prevailing exchange rate, average 
annual real international price of cocoa and the smuggling incentive defined as the ratio of real 
CIV cocoa producer price in dollars to the corresponding Ghanaian price are all integrated of 
order 1 and as mentioned earlier stationary in the first difference.  Table 3 reports pair-wise 
tests of co-integration for the variables. From the results the real international price of cocoa is 
co-integrated with Ghana cocoa supply.  This is consistent with what other researchers have 
found For example, (Bulir 2003) explains that the international price is the expectation of the 
domestic cocoa producer price.  For this reason, it has a long run or equilibrium relationship 
with Ghana cocoa supply.  In order words, the international price, but the domestic price of 
cocoa is expected to be co-integrated with Ghana cocoa supply response.  From Table 3, it’s 
clear that the domestic Ghana producer price fails the co-integration test at 5%.  Furthermore, 
the real Ghana cocoa producer price is co-integrated with the international cocoa price which is 
another result found by both Awudu and Reider (1994) and Bulir (2003).  Lastly the smuggling Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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Incentive is co-integrated with cocoa supply.  To establish the direction of causality between 
the variables pairs that were found to be co-integrated, we carried out Granger causality tests 
reported in Table 4.  Unfortunately some of the Granger causality test  results are inconclusive.  
For example, we were not able to confirm that the Smuggling Incentive Granger causes Ghana 
cocoa supply.  We also executed partial adjustment model in the spirit of Awudu and Reider 
(1995).  We found that the smuggling incentive was statistically significant at 5% . Table 5 
contrast the results from the single equation error correction model using the specifications by 
Awudu and Reider (No smuggling Incentive and data is not up to date) Bulir (No series for 
average maize price and uses data only through 1995) and the hybrid model we proposed that 
used the most recent data.  The results are not identical but similar.  The Awudu and Reider 
specification confirmed the result obtained by the authors:  The elasticity of supply of Ghana 
cocoa supply with respect to the domestic cocoa producer price is positive while the elasticity 
of supply of Ghana cocoa supply with respect to the maize price is negative. The results from 
the Bulir specification of the model and the hybrid specification are similar. The international 
cocoa price in positively statistically significantly related to cocoa supply in the long run wile 
the cocoa producer price correlated to supply response in the short run.  So as the producer 
price of cocoa increases, Ghanaian cocoa farmers respond by supplying more cocoa both in the 
short and long run.  Given the extensive lag time between planting and harvesting cocoa, it is 
unlikely the response in the short run is an acreage response.  Rather the negative smuggling 
incentive variable provides the clue:  As CIV producer prices decline relative to Ghana 
COCOBOD prices, Ghanaian farmers cease smuggling cocoa to CIV, CIV farmers smuggle 
cocoa into Ghana and no Ghanaian cocoa farmer leaves cocoa un-harvested.  Table 6.1 contains 
the stationarity test for the single equation error correction variables.  Stationarity of the error Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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correction model is a necessary condition that has to be satisfies before a single equation error 
correction model can be carried out.  All the models have error-correction terms that pass this 
test. 
As pointed out in the theory, the single equation error correction model can lead to 
misleading results if there are more than two variables suspected to be co-integrated.   
Johansen’s multivariate co-integration analysis is more appropriate in this case. Table 7 
displays our results from the Johansen (1993)’s multivariate co-integration test.  The trace 
statistic and the corresponding critical values are displayed. The null of 4 co-integration vectors 
is not rejected when we specify 5 variables.  Successive elimination isolates Ghana cocoa 
producer price as not part of the co-integrating relationship. This is just what we expect as 
farmers respond to increasing producer price immediately and not necessarily in the long run.  
Table 8 reports our results from the VECM specification of the model.  The international price 
is neither correlated with cocoa price in the long run nor the short run.  Ghana cocoa price is 
correlated to cocoa supply in the short run.  The smuggling incentive is statistically significant 
both in the long and short run and has the expected negative sign. 
Section V. Conclusion and Future Work 
The smuggling Incentive and the average price of maize are both necessary in explaining the 
current boom in the Ghana cocoa industry.  Any research does not consider these two variables 
or does not use the most complete available data set is not using all relevant information so 
estimators will likely be inefficient. Despite the encouraging results of this research more needs 
to be done to explain the boom in Ghana cocoa.  A full investigation of the possibility of 
structural breaks is vital.  Furthermore, there may be more relevant variables that were omitted.  
However, since the primary use of the model is forecasting this is not a huge problem if the Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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model works reasonably well which does because the errors from the model output is close to 
white noise and the deviations form actual output is small.   
Appendix 
Definition of variables (L at the end of a variable definition means the log of the variable): 
DATE = Time Series (Range = 1978 - 2005), PM  = Nominal price of 100kg maize bag, GCPI 
= Ghana CPI, GER  = US Ghanaian Cedi Exchange Rate, GSUP = Supply of Ghana Cocoa (= 
total export), NGCP = Nominal Ghana Cocoa Prices, NICP  = Nominal International Cocoa 
Price, USCPI = US CPI, DINTCP = NICP/USCPI, CIVCPI = CIV CPI, CIVER = US dollar 
CFA Exchange Rate, CIVCP = Nominal CIV Cocoa producer Prices, NICP  = Nominal 
International Cocoa Price, USCPI = US CPI, G$RPM = Real Maize Price, GSUP = Ghana 
Cocoa Supply, GHCP = Dollar Value of Deflated Domestic Ghana Cocoa Producer Prices, 
SMUG = Smuggling Incentive  = CIVCP – GHCP 
 
















Results of Stationarity tests 
Table 
1 
 D1=1 if break occurred after 1999; 0 
otherwise    
SSR  6.30E+10    




J  6 
D1 is 
irrelevant 
T-K  14  No Structural  
F-Stat 2.75    Change 
Fcrit(J, T-
K)=F(6,14) 4.76     Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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Table 2 Stationarity Tests
VARIABLES Test Statisitc 1% Crit Value 5% Crit Value MODEL CHOICE 10% Critical Value
1) GSUP 0.74 -2.65 -1.95 NC NT 2nd Lag -1.6
1ST DIFF GSUP -4.6 -2.65 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag -1.6
Conclusion 1st DF Stationary
2) DINTCPL -2.4 -2.65 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag -1.6
1ST DIFF DINTCPL -3.2 -2.65 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag -1.6
Conclusion 1st DF Stationary
3) GHCPL -1.78 -2.65 -1.95 C T 1st lag -1.6
1ST DIFF DINTCPL -4.18 -2.65 -1.95 C T 1st lag -1.6
Conclusion 1st DF Stationary
4) GDRPML -1.86 -2.65 -1.95 NC NC 1st lag -1.6
1ST DIFF DINTCPL -4.7 -2.65 -1.95 C T 1st lag -1.6
Conclusion 1st DF Stationary
5) SMUG 0.06 -2.65 -1.95 NC NC 8th lag -1.6
1ST DIFF DINTCPL -4.2 -2.65 -1.95 C T 8th lag -1.6
Conclusion Conclusion 1st DF Stationary
DEFINITIONS
GSUP Log of Ghana Cocoa Supply
DINTCPL Log of World  Cocoa Price Deflated
GHCPL Log of Ghana Cocoa Producer Price Deflated
GDRPML Log of Ghana Naize Producer  Price Deflated
SMUG Smuggling Incentive= CIV Price - Ghana Price
 
 
Table 3: Results of Co-integration Tests 
 
Table 3 Co-Integration Tests
VAR-PAIRS Test Statisitc 1% Crit Value 5% Crit Value MODEL CHOICE
1) DINTCPL& LGSUP
1ST DIFF LGSUP -4.6 -2.65 -1.95
1ST DIFF DINTCPL -1.78 -2.65 -1.95 C T 1st lag
Linear Combination -3.6 -4.38 -3.6 C T 2nd Lag
CONCLUSION CO-INTGRATED
2) DINTCPL&GHCPL
1ST DIFF DINTCPL -3.2 -2.65 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag
1ST DIFF GHCPL -1.78 -2.65 -1.95 C T 1st lag
Linear Combination -1.27 -2.66 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag
3) GHCPL&LGSUP
1ST DIFF LGSUP -4.6 -2.65 -1.95
1ST DIFF GHCPL -1.78 -2.65 -1.95 C T 1st lag
Linear Combination 0.54 -2.6 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag
CONCLUSION NOT CO-INTEGRATED
4)SMUG & LGSUP
1ST DIFF LGSUP -4.6 -2.65 -1.95 NC NT 1st Lag
1ST DIFF SMUG -4.2 -2.65 -1.95 C T 8th lag
Linear Combination -2.35 -2.6 -1.95 NC NT 4th lag
COCLUSION CO-INTEGRATED
DEFINITIONS
GSUP Log of Ghana Cocoa Supply
DINTCPL Log of World  Cocoa Price Deflated
GHCPL Log of Ghana Cocoa Producer Price Deflated
G$RPML Log of Ghana Naize Producer  Price Deflated
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Table 4: Results of Granger Causality Analysis 
Table 4a Granger Causality
VARIABLES DECISION Theory Says Test Statisitc=F(J,T-K)
1) DINTCPL & GHSUP REJECT Ho Reject Ho:γi=0 1.6
 DINTCPL granger causes GHSUP
NO




2) DINTCPL & GHCPL REJECT Ho Reject Ho:γi=0 1.5
 DINTCPL granger causes GHCPL
YES




3) GHCPL & GHSUP REJECT Ho Reject Ho:γi=0 2.5
 GHCPL granger causes GHSUP
YES
GHSUP granger GHCPL Accept Ho:γi=0 Accept Ho:γi=0 1.25
NO
Conclusion
One Way Causality  
 
Source Author Calculations
Table 4b Granger Causality
VARIABLES DECISION Theory Says Test Statisitc
4)SMUG & GSUP ACCEPT Reject Ho:γi=0 -0.7
 SMUG Granger Causes GHSUP
YES
GHSUP Granger Causes SMUG 0.6




Table 5: Partial Adjustment model results 
 
Table 5 Dependent Variable Cocoa Output
PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT Robust Estimation
Variable Name Test Statisitc 95% CI P-value Coeff
1st DIFF Cocoa output 2.04* -0.005-0.98 0.05 0.49
Domestic Ghana Cocoa producer Price 1.61 -0.04-0.36 0.122 0.16




* Means significant at 5% significance
 Stephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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Table 6: Single Equation Error Correction Model Results: Table 6a: Awudu and Reider Error 
Correction Model (Vector Error Correction Model), Table 6b: is Bulir (2003)’s Error 
Correction Model with Smuggling Incentive (VEC) Table 6c:  is the results of the hybrid 
Vector Error Correction Model (HECM) 
 
 
Table 6b1 Bulir Stationarity Tests
VARIABLES Test Statisitc 1% Crit Value 5% Crit Value MODEL 




Table 6c1 HYBRID Stationarity Tests
VARIABLES Test Statisitc 1% Crit Value 5% Crit Value MODEL 











Table 6 Error Correction Models
VARIABLES EQUATION 1 (A&R) 6a EQUATION 2 (Bulir Ales) 6b EQUATION 3 (HYBRID) 6c
Short Run Dynamics
GHCPL, 1st DIFF -0.07 0.09* 0.09*
SMUG, 1st DIFF -0.006 0.005*
GDRPML, 1st DIFF 0.12 0.01
Error Correction Term 0.18 0.42* 0.42*
Long-Run Eqm Relationship
 DINTCPL, 1st Lag 0.15 0.09
GDRPML, 1st Lag -0.16* -0.005
SMUG, 1st Lag -0.0008 -0.006*




Prob > F 0
rho 0.78
*Significant at 5% Level **Significant at 1% ***Significant at 10*
Source: Author's Calcuation
Table 6a1 A&W Stationarity Tests
VARIABLES Test Statisitc 1% Crit Value 5% Crit Value MODEL 
Error Correction Term -3.7 -4.38 -3.6 NC NT L2
Conclusion StationaryStephen E Armah. University of Illinois.  
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Table 7: Johansen's Trace Test of Co-Integration 
MODEL I VARIABLES 
GSUP GHCPL SMUG DINTCPL 
GDRPML    
GSUP, DINTCPL, 
GDRPML, SMUG 




 Johansen's Trace 
Test For # of Co-Integration 
Vectors    
Rank 
λtrace=T ∑ (sum over i, i = r+1 to n) 
log (1-λi)   λcritical 
0 66.14  47.21 
1 37.3  29.68 
2 19.17  15.41 
3 6.04  3.76 
Accept Null: 4  2  2.9 
5      
 




GHCPL, 1st DIFF 401605.3*
SMUG, 1st DIFF -41945.13 *
GSUP, 1st Diff 1*
GDRPML, 1st DIFF 459809.5
Error Correction Term
Long-Run Eqm Relationship
 DINTCPL, 1st Lag -43664
GDRPML, 1st Lag 0
SMUG, 1st Lag -6516.9*
GHCPL, 1st Lag -87078
GSUP, 1st Diff, 1st Lag -0.23*
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